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Summary  findings
In the 1980s development assistance shifted largely from  supervision or number of conditions - have no
financing investments (such as roads and dams) to  relationship with an adjustment program's success or
promoting policy reform. This change came because of a  failure.
growing awareness that developing countries were held  What development agencies must do, then, is select
back more by poor policies than by a lack of finance for  promising candidates for adjustment support. When the
investment.  candidate is a poor selection, devoting more
After nearly 20 years' experience with policy-based or  administrative resources or imposing more conditions
conditional lending, there have now been many studies  will not increase the likelihood of successful reform.
of adjustment lending, most of which take a case-study  To improve its success rate with adjustment lending,
approach. Many conclude that policy-based lending  the World Bank must become more selective and do a
works if countries have decided on their own to reform.  better job of understanding  which environments are
Dollar and Svensson examine a database of 220 World  promising for reform and which are not. That is likely to
Bank-supported reform programs to identify why  lead to fewer adjustment loans, unless there is a
adjustment programs succeed or fail.  significant change in the number of promising reformers.
They find that a few political economy variables can  To become more effective at supporting policy reform,
successfully predict the outcome of an adjustment loan  the agency must be willing to accept that this may lead to
75 percent of the time. Variables under the World Bank's  smaller volumes of lending.
control - resources devoted to preparation  and
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1. Introduction
Development  assistance  shifted  to a large extent  in the 1  980s  from financing
investment  (roads and dams)  to promoting  policy  reform. This  reorientation  arose from a
growing  awareness  that developing  countries  were held  back  more  by poor policies  than
by a lack  of finance  for investment. The development  community  has had nearly  twenty
years  of experience  now with policy-based  or conditional  lending. There have  been a large
number  of studies  of adjustment  lending,  almost  all of which  take a case study  approach.
Gustav  Ranis's conclusion  above  -- that policy-based  lending  works if countries  have
decided  on their own  to reform  -- is echoed  by other studies. Our objective  in this paper is
to look more systematically  at the causes  of success  or failure  of adjustment  programs,
using  a database  with 220 reform  programs  supported  financially  by the World  Bank.
We approach  this work with two hypotheses,  not mutually  exclusive.  The first
hypothesis  is the one noted above:  that success  or failure  of reform  depends  largely  on
political-economy  factors  within  the country  attempting  to reform. Our analysis  includes
several  variables  that capture elements  of the domestic  political  economy:  ethnic
fractionalization,  whether  leaders  are democratically  elected,  length  of tenure, and others.
It should  be pointed out upfront  that, even  if reform  depends  primarily  on domestic
2factors,  policy-based  lending  may  still  be useful. In this case  one should  view conditional
loans  primarily  as a commitment  technology:  they provide  an opportunity  for reformers  to
tie their own hands,  in the same  way  that membership  in the World  Trade Organization
commits  a government  to good policy  and insulates  it from special-interest  politics.
The data that we have  cannot  be used  to discern  whether  policy-based  loans  are an
effective  commitment  technology. To determine  this would  require  a study  of reform
programs  supported  by adjustment  loans  compared  to reform  programs  not supported  by
adjustment  loans.
What we can do with our data is look at the important  question  of whether  the
World  Bank's effort increases  the probability  of success  or failure  of a reform  program.
Thus, a second  hypothesis  to consider  -- not mutually  exclusive  with the first -- is that
factors  under  the control  of the World  Bank influence  the success  of adjustment  programs,
after controlling  for the domestic  political-economy  factors. The variables  under  the
World  Bank's control  include  the resources  devoted  to analytical  work prior to reform,
the resources  devoted  to preparation  and supervision  of adjustment  loans,  the number  of
conditions,  and the sequencing  of conditions  (prior actions  versus first, second,  or third
tranche  conditions).  In examining  this second  hypothesis  it is important  to recognize  that
the Bank effort  variables  are likely  to be endogenous.  We instrument  for these in a two-
stage  probit regression. The search  for good instruments  reveals  some  interesting
additional  information  about  how the World  Bank  allocates  resources  among  activities.
We find  considerable  support for the first hypothesis,  that domestic  political-
economy  factors influence  strongly  the success  or failure  of reform  programs  supported  by
3adjustment  loans. We find  no evidence  that any of the variables  under  the World  Bank's
control  affect  the probability  of success  of an adjustment  loan. It is possible  of course  that
in exceptional  cases  the World Bank's effort  affects  reform. What this kind of
econometric  work identifies  is what is true on average  or in general. There are a number
of countries -- Kenya or Zambia, for example -- in which the Bank had a series of mostly
failed  adjustment  loans. Our work suggests  that these were not fertile  grounds  for reform,
that there are observable  indicators  that could  have  predicted  this, and that the World
Bank working  harder  was not going  to transform  Kenya  or Zambia  into a successful
reformer.
These  results  have  clear implications  for how to manage  policy-based  lending.
They suggest  that the role of adjustment  lending  is to identify  reformers  not to create
them. Development  agencies  need  to devote  resources  to understanding  the political
economy  of different  countries  and to finding  promising  candidates  for support. The key
to successful  adjustment  lending  is to find  good candidates  to support. Adding  more
conditions  to loans  or devoting  more  resources  to manage  them does not increase  the
probability  of reform. In fact, the World  B3ank  devotes  far more resources  to the failed
programs. Once a bad loan  is made  there is a tendency  to put a lot of resources  into
salvaging  it, and our evidence  shows  that this is fruitless.
There is a large opportunity  cost to managing  policy-based  lending  badly,  and it
comes  in three forms. First, almost  all adjiustment  loans disburse  fully,  even  if policy
conditions  are not met. Thus, poor choices  about  which  reform  programs  to support lead
to disbursement of large amounts of aid inito  poor policy environments. Bumside and
4Dollar (1997)  have  shown  that aid promotes  growth only  in a good policy  environment,  so
that the channeling  of resources  into poor policy  environments  that accompanies  failed
adjustment  programs  has a high cost. Second,  the World  Bank devotes  more
administrative  resources  to failed  programs  than  to successful  ones, and we show  that
these resources  have  no impact. Deininger,  Squire,  and Basu (1997) have  shown  that the
Bank's administrative  resources  have  a high  return in investment  projects,  so that using
these resources  on low-probability  reformers  has an opportunity  cost. Finally,  our results
support  the view that the best  justification  for policy-based  lending  is as a commitment
technology  for sincere  reformers. However,  the effectiveness  of this technology  is
undermined  if adjustment  ioans are given indiscriminately.  In the data set, one-third  of
adjustment  programs  supported  by the World  Bank  failed. Such a failure  rate may
undermine  the potential  usefulness  of the instrument. One reason, for example,  that
reformers  might  welcome  a commitment  technology  is to convince  private investors  that
policy  change  is permanent. However,  if one-third  of adjustment  programs  fail (and in
most cases  money  is still  disbursed),  then this instrument  is not a very good signal  and not
much  of a commitment  technology. To improve  the success  rate of adjustment  programs,
the World  Bank  needs  to be more selective  and discerning  in providing  this kind of
assistance.
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follow:  The next section  provides  the
analytical  framework  and develops  the two hypotheses  in more detail,  relating  them  to the
theoretical  literature  on policy  reform. Section  3 provides  the main  empirical  results. The
paper ends  with a brief  concluding  section.
52. Analytical  framework
We build our empirical specification on two stands of literature, on the one hand
the mainly theoretical literature on politicall  economy of policy reform, on the other hand
the mainly case study literature on policy design and World Bank behavior. In this section
we briefly discuss the most important variELbles  for the success of structural reforms that
have been identified in this literature.
Before proceeding, several caveats are in order. First, the questions asked in the
political economics literature is typically "why," or "when" a country chooses to reform or
not. The question, why a country initiates a reform but then subsequently chooses not to
implement the reform package, has received much less attention.  Our data cover this
latter type of situation. Hence, it is not possible to apply the predictions from the political
economics literature literally.
The standard justification for Worlid  Bank structural adjustment lending is that
reforms have short-run costs and foreign assistance can help reforms get launched by
alleviating these costs. External resources, however, also reduce the cost of doing nothing,
that is avoiding reform. The argument from the proponents of foreign assistance is that aid
is disbursed conditional on reform. However, if the donor cannot perfectly tell if the
recipient government is a genuine reformer, it faces an adverse selection problem. A
country not committed to reform may findl  it in its interest to initiate a reform in order to
subsequently receive foreign assistance. Then, once aid is disbursed, the recipient may not
exert much effort in making the reform succeed [see Rodrik (1989)]. This argument has
empirical support. Collier (1997) argues ifor example  that African governments almost
6never declined aid-for-reform packages, even if they had little intention of sustaining the
reforms. For our purposes, we want to use the political economy literature to identify
governments that are not likely to be committed to reform ex ante, but also to identify
factors that affect the probability of success once the reform has been launched.
An additional problem concerns the distinction between economic stabilization and
structural reform. It has been common practice in much of the literature to conflate these
two groups of policies. In this paper we are concerned with the latter. Again, this implies
that the predictions from the political economy literature must be judged carefully.
The last caveat has to do with coverage.' We have singled out two strands of the
literature as the basis for our empirical specification. However, even within these areas we
constrain the discussion primarily  to those topics for which we are able to collect reliable
data.
2.1. Political Economy
Recently, the theory of macroeconomic policy and economic reforms has changed
focus. Instead of viewing the making and implementation of economic policy as a control
problem in which the issue is to find the optimal policy rule, the core of the analysis  has
shifted to the actual policy process. Observed economic polices are explained by appealing
to specific incentive constraints that may be binding for optimizing policymakers.
The theoretical literature in political economy has identified several factors
affecting  the likelihood of successful,  reforms. 2 The first one that we pick up on is political
I There is a large political  science literature  on policy  reforms  which  we will not cover,  see e.g. Haggard
& Kaufman  (1992),  Nelson  (1990).  There is also a huge literature  on political  economy  of reform  based
on case-study  evidence  that we hardly  touch upon. A short,  but incomplete,  biography  include  Bates &
Krueger  (1993),  Haggard  & Webb  (1994),  Ranis & Mahmood  (1991)  and Williamson  (1994).
2 For a recent review  of the literature,  see Tommasi  & Velasco  (1995).
7instability. 3 Generally, political instability shortens the time horizon of a reforming
government. The reason for this is that political instability  creates an asymmetry with
respect to cost and benefits of a reform. Typically,  the cost of a reform must be born
immediately,  while the expected benefits occur in the future. If the incumbent is uncertain
he/she will reap the benefits of the reform, this may affect the incentives to exert
adjustment effort in the first place.
Implicit in the political instability  approach is the view that policy is determined in
a unified fashion. A related branch of the lilterature  focuses instead on distributional
conflicts across powerful groups in society. Alesina & Drazen (1991) show how
stabilization can be delayed due to a "war of attrition" between two powerful groups [see
also Laban & Sturzenegger (1992) and Velasco (1993)]. In the Alesina & Drazen model,
the two groups both bear a cost as long as the stabilization is delayed. A stabilization  can
only occur if both groups agree to it, but the first to concede bears a larger fraction of the
cost of reforrns. Since the cost of not stabilizing  may differ across groups and is private
information, each group has an incentive to postpone concession in the hope that the
opponent will be the first to give in. Taken literally the model focuses on delay in initiating
reform. In the "ongoing reform" context a natural interpretation is instead an excessive
dose of gradualism in continuing with an already initiated reform.
Alesina & Drazen (1991) show that the more uneven the expected costs of
stabilization when it occurs (lower political coercion), the later is the expected date of
stabilization, or the more excessive the dose of gradualism. Underlying  the Alesina &
3 See  for example  Persson  & Svensson  (1989),  Tabellini  & Alesina  (1991)  for models  of fiscal  policy  and
political  instability,  and Svensson  (1997a)  for  a model  and empirical  evidence  on  the relationship  between
structural  [legal]  reforms  and political  instability.
8Drazen (1991) model is the view that (latent) social conflict is a key factor determining the
success of structural reforms.  Thus, a second variable that we want to introduce into our
empirical analysis is one capturing social cohesion.
Another dimension that has received attention is the identity of the government
(free-marketeers, right wing, left-wing, populist). One might conjecture that typical free-
marketeers are most likely to carry out market fiiendly reforms. However, Cukierman &
Tommasi (1994) suggest that policies are more likely to be successful if proposed by
"unlikely"  characters. If voters are not fuilly  informed about the way polices map to
outcomes, a "populist" government's ability to implement a reform with short-run costs
may be greater than the ability of an "ideological" reformer. The reason is that if a
"rpopulist"  government proposes a reform, the public has less reason to suspect that the
reform is initiated because of ideological tendencies rather than for efficiency-enhancing
reasons, and may therefore support it more strongly.
The issue of identity of the reformer is a subset of a much larger issue: credibility. 4
Apart from questions on speed and sequencing of reforms, of interest for empirical work is
the argument that a new "reforming" government typically enjoys a "honeymoon" which
may extend to months, even years [see Tommasi & Velasco (1995)].5 At the other
spectrum, Cukierman & Liviatan (1  992) show that it takes time to build up a reputation.
While there exists a large case-study based literature on democratization (political
liberalization) and economic reforms [see for example Haggard & Webb (1994)], there is
4See  for  example  Calvo  (1989)  for references.
5There exists  a large  literature  on sequencing  and  speed  of reforms.  We  have  left  this issue  out  of the
discussion  due  to lack  of reliable  indicators  to measure  these  variables.  For  references  see  e.g. Edwards
(1989),  Edwards  and  Van  Wijnberger  (1986),  Calvo  (1989),  Dewatripoint  and Roland  (1992,  95).
Martinelli  and Tomnmasi  (1993),  Rodrik  (1989).
9only  limited  theoretical  work. In fact, the theoretical  work on the role of democracy  and
policy  choices  does not explicitly  deal  with economic  reforms,  but economic  policy
making  in general.  Banks  & Sundaram  (1993),  and Besley  & Coate (1995), show  that the
desire  to build  a reputation  may  provide  a (lemocratically  elected  government  with the
incentives  to raise (adjustment)  effort. Svensson  (1997c)  studies  another mechanism,
whereby  political  liberalization  raises  the incentives  for public  agencies  to implement
polices  more efficiently.  However,  a democratic  government  also faces  constraints  that
may  lower  its incentive  to exert effort  in imrplementing  reforms.  For instance,  a democratic
government  may  be more shortsighted  in that a reform  with  initial  costs but benefits
occurring  in the future may  not be implemented  owing  to the fear of not getting reelected.
Thus, the literature  suggests  that whether  a leader  is democratically  elected  and length  of
tenure  may  affect  the probability  of successful  reform.
That economic  crises  seem  either  to facilitate  or outright  cause economic  reform  is
part of the new conventional  wisdom  [see 1.'or  example  Tommasi  & Velasco  (1995)]. The
argument  is straightforward.  By making  a delay  more costly  (shock  that increases  the cost
of inflation,  for instance)  this can actually  accelerate  the arrival  of stabilization. 6 However,
the theoretical  work on this issue is related  to fiscal  stabilization  [see  Drazen  & Grilli
(1993),  Velasco  (1993)].  With respect  to structural  reforms  this is much less  clear.  In fact
it has been argued  that reforms  in a recession  may  involve  a much  higher  political  cost and
therefore  be more  difficult  to implement.  COn  the other hand,  Rodrik (1994),  stressing  the
agenda-setting  role of a reformist  government,  argues  that crisis  enables  a reformist
6Moreover,  crises  can actually  increase  welfare  if the indirect  effect  of reducing  the delay  outweighs  the
direct  cost  of  the  crisis.
10government  to package  fiscal  stabilization  -- viewed  as crucial  for the return to price
stability  -- with structural  reform  -- viewed  as desirable  in the longer  run but incidental  to
the immediate  crisis.  Policy-makers  presenting  domestic  interests  with  the whole  package
are more likely  to get general  support.  Even though  the interest  groups  prefer  to have  only
the stabilization  component  of the package,  this is not a choice  they  face.
Analytically  the crises  hypothesis  is not without  problem.  As pointed  out by Rodrik
(1996),  there is a strong  element  of tautology  in the association  of reform  with crises.
Adjustment  naturally  becomes  an issue  only  when current policies  are perceived  not to be
working.  A crisis  is  just the extreme  instance  of policy  failure. In our empirical  work we
try to identify  several  measures  that capture the extent  of pre-reform  crisis.
In summary,  the theoretical  literature  does not provide  clear guidance  as to what
kind of government  is likely  to sustain  a reform  program. It does, however,  suggest  some
variables  that one should  include  in an empirical  analysis  of the likelihood  of successful
reform. Thus, our first hypothesis  is that the success  or failure  of reform  is determined  to
some  extent by political  economy  variables,  such as measures  of political  instability,
measures  of polarization  and social  division,  the length  of tenure  of the government,
extent  of pre-reform  crisis,  and whether  the government  is democratically  elected. As can
be seen  in table 1, we were able  to collect  data for a range  of variables  that capture  these
influences.
2.2. World Bank  Policies  -- Conditionality
There is by now a fairly  large  literature  on World Bank  policies  and  conditionality
and their effectiveness,  both by the World  Bank  and by outside  observers  [see for example
11Mosley  (1987),  Thomas  (1991),  Mosley  et al.  (1995) and several  World  Bank studies].
The weight  of this case  study evidence  is that variables  under  the World  Bank's control  do
not have  a large effect  on success  or failure  of reform,  a proposition  that we would  like  to
test formally.  For example,  Mosley  et al. (1995) conclude  from case  study evidence  that
conditional  World  Bank  aid has affected  the:  polices  of the recipients  "a little,  but not as
much  as the Bank hoped" [Mosley  et al., 1995,  p.305].  They argue  that the main  reason
for this is conflicting  interests  on the World  Bank's part. The objective  of policy-based
lending  is not only  to change  the policy  structure  viewed  to be at the heart of the problem
facing  the recipient  country,  and indirectly  increase  the likelihood  of success  of World
Bank  projects,  but also to provide  quick-disbursing  finance  so as to hinder  potential
defaults  on its outstanding  loans,  as well  as loans  from influential  countries  and  their
commercial  banks.  With respect  to conditionality,  Mosley's  (1995)  conclusion  is in line
with the World Bank's own  recent review  of policy-based  lending  [Branson  & Jayarajah
(1995)] -- conditionality  is more effective  when it focuses  on a small  range of quantifiable
indicators.
Collier  arrives  at a more pessimistic:  conclusion  -- "conditionality  has failed"
[Collier,  1997,  p.57]. Collier  argues  that some  governments  have  chosen  to reform,  others
to regress,  but that these choices  appear  to have  been  largely  independent  of the aid
relationship.  This conclusion  is in line  with both recent empirical  and theoretical  findings.
Burnside  and Dollar  (1997)  find that aid does not seem  to affect  macroeconomic  policies
(trade openness, fiscal surplus and inflation) in any systematic way, neither have the
donors  allocated  aid  to countries  with "good" polices.  Svensson  (I997b) provides
12theoretical  underpinnings  for the result,  building  on the moral  hazard problem  of foreign
assistance  and the time inconsistency  problem  in punishing  non-reforming  countries.
Collier  (1997) argues  forcefully  that government  policy  is determined  by domestic  political
forces, rather than  what the World  Bank conditions  its aid upon.
3. Explaining Success or Failure of Adjustment Programs
Can the success  or failure  of adjustment  programs  be explained  by political
economy  variables? Do variables  under  control  of the World  Bank have  any effect  on the
success  rate of its adjustment  loans? These  are the primary  questions  that we address  in
this section. We started  with 272 World Bank  adjustment  loans  completed  during  the
period [1980-1995]. For 179  of these loans  we have  been able  to assemble  data on
several  political-institutional  factors,  other exogenous  variables  (such as initial  per capita
GDP and population),  and variables  under  the World Bank's control.
The dependent  variable  in this analysis  is a zero-one  variable  reflecting  failure  or
success  of each adjustment  loan  as determined  by the Operations  Evaluation  Department
(OED)  of the World Bank. There are several  reasons  why  we think  that this is an
acceptable  measure  of success. First, the objective  of OED evaluation  is not to look
narrowly  at whether  loan  conditionalities  were met or not; rather,  the evaluators  make a
judgment  as to whether  or not the larger objective  of reform  has been  met (has trade
become  more  liberal,  have enterprises  actually  been privatized?). Second,  while  there is
clearly  a subjective  element  to such  an assessment,  OED's independence  within  the World
Bank  means  that there is no necessary  bias  in the results. OED is independent  of the
13Bank's senior  management;  it has a budget  allocated  directly  by the Board of Directors
and reports to them. Third,  OED has found that about one-third  of adjustment  loans  fail.
In our sample,  36% of the reform  programs  are  judged by OED  not to have  met their
objectives.  Finally,  the OED measure  is meant  to capture change  in policy.  Most previous
work on explaining  adjustment  progress  has used different  outcome  measures  (or changes
in them) as proxies  of reform,  but that has obvious  shortcomings.  For example,  outcome  is
partly  driven  by exogenous  shocks  which  are difficult  to disentangle  from policy  effects,
there is lag  between  policy  change  and outcome,  and reforms  differ  in objectives  and may
therefore  not be captured  by a single  outcome  meausure.  We avoid  these problems  by
using the OED  measure.
Our model  can be outlined  as follows.  Lety  be the probability  of success  of
adjustment  program  i. This  probability  is not directly  observable.  Instead  we observe  a
zero-one  indicator  of success,  yi. Let pi be an nx I vector of political-economy  variables
reflecting  country  conditions  at the time of approval  of adjustment  loan  i; b 1 be a kx I
vector of variables,  associated  with adjustment  loan  i, under the World Bank's control;  z 1
be an mx  1  vector of exogenous  variables  tlhat  do not influence  success  or failure  of
reform;  and ey,  (a scalar)  and 
6bi (a kx I vector) mean-zero  error terms. Then the model
can be expressed  as
Yi =cy +  bj  py  +  +yp+  (I)
bi=  Cb + Xb2Zi  +  bpPi + 
6bi  (2)
where  cy  is a scalar,  6, and  Cb are kx I vectors,  &  is a nx  1 vector, X is a mxk matrix,  and
,fbp  is a nxk matrix.
14There are several  issues  in trying  to estimate  these equations. If the World Bank
control  variables  were independent  of the error term in (1), then  we could use probit to
estimate  the zero-one  indicator  of success. However,  it is likely  that the error terms in (2)
are correlated  with the error term in (1). An exogenous  shock  that reduces  the probability
of success  is likely  to call  forth more preparation  and supervision  resources.  Thus, in order
to estimate  these relationships  it will be necessary  to find  good instruments:  that is,
exogenous  variables  that are correlated  with Bank effort  but that do not influence  success
or failure  of reform. We will argue that there are such instruments  and  use a two-stage
procedure  to estimate  equation  (1). We will also estimate  equations  for two of the most
important  Bank-effort  variables,  the amount  of preparation  resources  and  the amount  of
supervision  resources.
Before  proceeding  it is useful  to take an initial  look at some  of the data. We have
almost  all of the necessary  data for 182  adjustment  loans  (65 failures,  or 36% of the
sample;  and 117 successes,  or 64%).  It can be seen in Table  2a that successful  adjustment
loans  are associated  with governments  that were democratically  elected  (50% of successes
compared  to 32% of failures). Also, political  instability  (measured  here  by the average
number  of government  crises)  is highly  correlated  with failed  adjustment. Two variables
that we will  use in a non-linear  fashion  are ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  and length  of
time  that a government  has been  in power.
What is striking  in Table  2a is that the World  Bank related  variables  are
remarkably  similar  for successful  and failed  adjustment  loans. Number  of conditions  and
loan  size are nearly  identical. Successful  loans  get about 10%  more preparation  resources
15(measured in staffweeks) than failed loans.  The most striking difference is that failed loans
get about 50% more supervision staffiveeks. We will show that this relationship is
endogenous, once the World Bank has made a bad loan it puts a lot of resources into
trying to salvage it.  The interesting question will be whether those supervision resources
make any difference, after controlling for this endogeneity.
Table 3 reports a series of prob.it  regressions that attempt to explain the probability
of success. 7 For comparison, we also report the results of using a linear probability model
in Table 6. Regression 1 has only the political-economy variables: success is associated
with democratic government and with political stability. Ethnic fractionalization and
length of time that the incumbent has been in power enter non-linearly: the basic message
is that high degrees of fractionalization are bad for policy reform, and that long-term
incumbents are not likely candidates for reform. The turning points for the length of tenure
and ethnic fractionalization vary between 15-21 years and 0.44-0.49 respectively in Table
3. These relationships are pretty strong and the basic story is a plausible one.  A recently
elected government that launches reforn  has a 95% chance of success, ceteris paribus,
compared to only about a 65% probability of success for an authoritarian leader in power
already for 13 years (Figure 1). That high probability of success for an elected reformer,
however, can be undermined by political instability and ethnic division. An interesting
finding is that the marginal impact of a democratically elected government (about 20
percent higher probability of success) is quantitatively independent of the degree of ethnic
fractionalization, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, democratically elected governments have a
7Using a probit  model  instead of a linear probability  model  has a number  of well known  advantages  [see
Judge et al (1985)1.
16higher probability of successfully  implementing reforms, irrespective of underlying degree
of ethnic fragmentation. Using only the political-economy variables, regression 1 predicts
correctly 75 percent of the observations.'
In Regression 2 we add some additional exogenous variables: initial per capita
GDP, population, and regional dummies. Note that the predicted ability of the model goes
down from 75 percent to 73 percent and that none of these variables has much relationship
with outcomes.  This is important because we are going to use these variables as
instruments. It is interesting that adjustment loans do tend to be less successful in low-
income countries and in Africa. But Regression 2 indicates that those associations arise
from the fact that low-income countries and African countries have characteristics that are
not conducive to reform.  With political-economy variables in the equation, there is no
significance  to the African regional dummy or to initial per capita GDP.
In Regression 3 we add Bank-related variables to a probit regression, recognizing
that there is an endogeneity issue that has not yet been addressed.  Some of these variables
we are going to argue are exogenous: whether the adjustment loan focuses on trade
reform or sectoral reform depends on the nature of the policy problems in the country and
the government's desire to attack particular problems. What is clearly under the Bank's
influence is the amount of preparation staffweeks; amount of supervision staffweeks; the
staffweeks devoted to analytical work in the four years prior to the loan; the number of
conditions; how conditions are allocated between upfront conditionality and first, second,
and third tranches; the size of the loan; and the expected length of the reform program.
8  The prediction  rule is y = I if the predicted  probability > 0.5. and 0 otherwise;  that is, we predict  a I if
the model  says a I is more likely  than a 0.
17It is difficult  to instrument for all of these endogenous variables at the same time.
We use the simple correlations and the partial correlations in the probit regressions to
eliminate the variables that seem to have no relationship at all with outcome: number of
conditions, loan size, prior analytical work, and expected length of the reform program. 9
Regression 4 shows the probit regression after these are removed.  Of the remaining
Bank-related variables, the interesting story is that preparation is positively associated with
outcomes and supervision, negatively associated. Once we control for these two variables,
the number of conditions and the allocation of conditions play no role.
In Regression 5 we instrument ifor  preparation and supervision, using the two-
stage generalized least squares estimator derived by Amemiya (1978).10  The specifications
for preparation and supervision are depicted in Table 4 (column 2) and Table 5 (column
2). Once these Bank-effort variables are treated as endogenous, there is no relationship
between any of them and the success or failure of adjustment programs.  In Regression 6
we drop all of the Bank variables except preparation and supervision -- for which we
instrument -- and again find no relationship.
The relationship between the political-economy variables and outcomes is stable
throughout all of the regressions.  This finding is consistent with the view that there are
institutional and political factors that afTect  the probability of success of a reform program.
Given those factors, none of the variables under the World Bank's control affects success
or failure of adjustment programs.  If endogeneity is ignored, there is a positive
9The measure  of  analytical  work  in the  four  years  prior  to the  adjustment  loan  comes  from  Deininger  and
Squire (1997). They  find that that this variable  has a strong  association  with success  of investment  loans;
our regressions show that this is not the case iFor  adjustment loans.
10  See appendix for a brief description of the two-stage estimator.
18relationship between preparation and outcomes, and a negative relationship between
supervision and outcomes.  That these relationships disappear in the two-stage regressions
indicates that the associations reflect how the World Bank allocates resources.  In other
words, preparation resources favor winners and supervision resources favor losers.
We also tried several other political variables in the outcome regression, including
income inequality (as a proxy for distributional conflicts), terms of trade shocks, and the
level of inflation and budget surplus prior to the reform (as a rough test of the crisis
hypothesis). However, once we control for the variables defined in Table 2a, none of these
additional regressors has any explanatory power. As we lose a number of observations by
including these additional controls, we leave them out of the base specification. As shown
in Table 2b, however, successful adjustment loans are associated with countries with
better fiscal balance prior to the reform and larger exogenous shocks during the reform
period. One explanation for why the policy variables still do not provide additional
information in the outcome regression is that they are driven by the same socio-political
variables that affect the likelihood of success [see for example Easterly & Levine (1997)].
In fact, in simple bivariate regressions with prior fiscal stance as dependent variable, initial
budget surplus enters with a positive and significant sign.
We turn next to an explicit examination of the allocation of preparation and
supervision resources.  First, we look at the relationship between preparation and the
political-economy variables (Table 4, Regression 1).  There is very little relationship,
except that more resources are allocated to democratically elected reformers (this is
probably what accounts for the correlation between preparation and success).  Regression
192 shows a more completely specified equation for preparation resources.  Note that
preparation is strongly related to a number of variables that in turn have no relationship
with outcomes (which is why we have adequate instruments to examine the relationship
between preparation and success of reform). First, the World Bank allocates different
amounts of resources to different regions, so that preparation resources tend to be low in
East Asia and Latin America relative to Africa." 1 (It is interesting that in the outcome
equation the political-economy variables are significant  while regional dummies are not;
whereas in the allocation of preparation resources we have the opposite: regional dummies
matter while most of the political-economy factors do not.)  Second, there are more
resources for large loans and for those with many conditions, though again these
characteristics are unrelated to outcomes.  Finally, resources go to low-income countries
and to countries small in population.
There is a broadly similar story for the allocation of supervision resources (Table
5, Regression 1). These resources favor loans that are large and have lots of conditions.
Also, low-income countries and those smal:l  in population get more supervision resources.
Unlike the preparation equation, regional dummies are no longer important.  12  The
regional departments of the World Bank have different amounts to prepare loans, but once
these loans are approved the regions devote similar resources to supervising a loan of
given characteristics. In the supervision equation we also have to consider that
preparation may affect supervision. In stuclying  World Bank-financed investment projects,
1 F-statistic  on the joint hypothesis  that the coefficients  on the regional  dummies  are zero is 3.21. Thus,
we can reject  the hypothesis  at the 5 percent  significance  level.
12F-statistic  on the joint hypothesis  that the coefficients  on the regional  dumnmies  are zero is 1.55.  Thus,
we cannot reject the hypothesis  at the 5 percent  significance  level.
20researchers have found that more preparation resources lead to a smaller need for
supervision resources.  However, preparation and supervision are both associated with
better outcomes in investment projects.  Since there is no relationship between preparation
and the success of adjustment programs, it seems unlikely that a large amount of
preparatory work would diminish  the need for supervision.
In the OLS regression (Table 5, Regression 1) there is a large, positive relationship
between preparation and supervision. This reflects the fact that the error terms in the
preparation and supervision equations are certainly correlated.  Anything unobserved that
leads to higher (lower) than predicted preparation will almost certainly lead to higher
(lower) than predicted supervision. The fact that the regional dummies seem to belong in
the preparation equation but not in the supervision equation means that we can use them
as instruments to correct for this simultaneity  problem.  In the two-stage least squares
regression (Regression 2), the relationship between preparation and supervision is no
longer significant.
4. Conclusion
In the 1  980s the World Bank approved four structural adjustment loans for
Zambia, totaling $212 million. All of these loans disbursed almost fully (less than two
percent of the committed amount was canceled altogether).  After they were completed,
the independent Operations Evaluation Department within the World Bank rated three out
of four as failures; that is, the reform measures supported by three out of four loans were
not satisfactorily implemented. Our results suggest that this outcome was largely
21predictable. Zambia at that time did not have conditions conducive to reform.  The
government had not been democratically elected. It had been in power for a long time in a
country that is highly ethnically  fragmented. Such a government is not a likely reformer.
More generally, we have shown tha.t a small number of political economy variables
can predict the outcome of an adjustment loan successfully 75% of the time.  When
variables under the World Bank's control -- resources devoted to preparation and
supervision or number of conditions -- are added to the analysis,  they have no relationship
with success or failure of adjustment programs.  Our work taken in concert with other
research suggests that the key issue for development agencies is to select promising
candidates for adjustment support.  When a poor selection is made, devoting more
administrative  resources or imposing more conditions will not increase the likelihood of
successful reform.
If the World Bank would like to improve its success rate with adjustment lending,
then it must become more selective and do a better job of understanding what are
promising environments for reform and what are not.  This change is likely to lead to
fewer adjustment loans unless there is a significant  exogenous change in the number of
promising reformers. To become more effective at supporting policy reform the agency
would have to be willing to accept that this may lead to smaller volumes of lending.
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25Appendix
A.I.  Estimation of a simultaneous probit model
The model with preparation and supervision as endogenous variables is
r,  = ZriAr + P;  + 8n  (A. 1)
S, = g,rr, + Zsi  A  + PiAsp + e6  (A.2)
y.  =  yrri  +  y's*  + Pil3yp + e)yi  (A.3)
Where y* is the probability of success of adjustment program i.  This probability is not
directly  observable. Instead we observe a zero-one indicator of success, yi. si and r 1 are
supervision and preparation, respectively, of program i. All other variables are defined in
section 3, where  z'  is a subset of z' , and wherep'  includes a constant.
In reduced vector form
r = X[D]  +  (A.4)
s = XV2  + U2  (A.5)
Y*  = Xn 3 +U3  (A.6)
Where  Xis a tx(n+m) matrix of predetermined variables. Let a'  = [5yr,(ysy  /  ,8],  and
°'  =  [
6 yr,ys  ].  We assume that E.,  >  £g,  yi have a joint normal distribution with mean
zero and covariance matrix
n Q  Er  i;sYl  (A.  7)
where we have normalized  1.
A.1.1 Estimation of a'
The two-stage procedure proposed Heckman (1977), Nelson and Olson (1977) and others
[see Lee (1981)], would be to estimate HlI  and [12  by OLS and 13 by probit, then estimate
(A.3) by probit after substituting X[1,  for r and  All2 for s.  That is
y  =  /3yrAl d-  YSMA2 + P/3 yp + 77  (A.8)
Instead of estimating (A.8), Amemiya (1978) suggests one should solve by regression
methods the structural parameters from the estimated reduced form parameters. Based on
this principle, one can derive asymptotically  more efficient estimators.  As shown by
Amemiya, the key to this result is to note that the structural parameters are related to the
reduced form parameters according to
- IHI3  =  rI 5 yr  + 71  2
6 ys  + Jy'3YP  (A.  9)
where  XJY = p.  Amemiya shows that by exploiting equation (A.6) and (A.8), equation
(A.9) can be written as
13  = Gay  + v  (A. 10)
26where v +1  3 113]  SyrEr,l  ln]3y[[2  ['2.1  and U =[ IH 2 J  ].
The estimates  suggested  by.  Amemiya  are generalized  least squares,  GLS, estimates
given  by
acG  = (G  -' (;)I)1 &' V-I  13  (A.  I11)
where V is a consistent  estimator  of the asymptotic  variance-covariance  matrix  of v.
Thus,  to be able  to estimate  (A.  I 1), we need a consistent  estimator  of V.
Rivers  and Vuong  (1988), using  the results  derived  in Amemiya  (1978),  show that
V = d(X'X)-'  +  Vo  (A.  12)
where d = 8yE  rs,5  - 28'7,,  and VO  is the variance-covariance  matrix  of t13.  Initial
consistent  estimate 8y can be obtained  from n[ n2,  and n3 [Amniemiya  (1979)]. As for
as,  j = {r,  s}, it may  be consistently  estimated  by
CoJy  = T-'(yi'V,if')  (A.13)
where Prij]  is the least squares  residual  from (A.4) [(A.5)],  and
2  (A.14)
The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of a'  is
V(aCy)  = (G'V-'G)'  (A.  15)
27Figure 1. Elections, Tenure, amid  Probability of Successful  Reform
100%
95% 
90%  Democratically  elected
w  85% -
a  80%  \
,75%-- ZI-
Q  70%  Not democratically





O  N~J  CV  )  t  IV  )  cO  r-  co  C  0  O  _  N  )  '  UL)
*-  Years in power







40% --  /  Not democratically  elected\  \




0  O  v-  LnNU  O  t  L  O  LO (O  Or.WC  W  o  LO
Ethniic fractionalization
Note: The probabilities are evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables. The marginal
effect of a democratically elected government  is the difference between the two functions.
028Table 1. Variables defined in the political economy literature and empirical proxies
Variable defined in the literature  Empirical proxy
Political instability  Average number of govemmental crises during
the implementation  of the program
[Source:Banks (1994)]
Social division  Ethic fragmentation [Source: Easterly & Levine
(1997)], Income inequality [Source: Deininger
& Squire (1996)]
Length of tenure  Years the incumbent that signed the reform has
been in power [Source: Europa Yearbook
(various years)]
Democratically elected  Dummy variable taking the value I if the
incumbent that signed  the reform was put in
power by a democratic election prior to the
reform, 0 otherwise [Source: Europa Yearbook
(various years]
Crisis  Terms-of-trade shock: prior reform, during
implementation of reform [Source: WD1 1997],
Inflation prior to reform [Source: WDI 19971,
Budget surplus prior to reformn  [Source: WDI
1997]
29Table 2a.  Features of Successful and Failed Adjustment Programs
Successful  Failed
Country  Characteristics
Democratically  Elected  50.4%/,  32.3%
Government  Crisis  During  Reform  8.0%  22.8%
Period
Ethnoliguistic  Fractionalization  0.48  0.51
Length  of Time  the Incumbent  has  7.5  7.8
been  in Power  Prior to the Reform
World  Bank  Related  Variables
Preparation  Staff Weeks  141  128
Supervision  Staff Weeks  69  101
Number of Conditions  45  44
Loan Size  (million  $)  160  153
Sample  Information
Number  of Loans  117  65
Table 2b.  Features of Successful and Failed Adjustment Programs (small sample)
Successfil  Failed
Country  Characteristics
Budget  surplus  prior to the reform  -0.043  -0.059
Inflation  prior to the reform  27 %  34 %
Income  inequality  44.0  43.5
Terms  of trade shock  -1.92  -1.54
30Table 3.  Probit Outcome Regressions
Dependent variable: OED evaluation on adiustnent operations
Regression  No.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Observations  220  215  163  182  179  179
Countries  67  67  58  60  60  60
Constant  -0.098  -0.753  -0.735  -0.895  -0.366  1.175
(-0.32)  (-0.34)  (-0.46)  (-0.83)  (-0.25)  (0.93)
Ethnic Fractionalization  5.930  6.218  6.590  8.584  7.763  6.861
(4.16)  (4.00)  (3.00)  (4.52)  (4.04)  (3.74)
Ethnic  Fractionalization 2 -6.513  -7.00  -6.940  -8.804  -8.046  -7.212
(-4.27)  (-3.89)  (-3.01)  (-4.40)  (-3.79)  (-3.57)
Government  Crisis  -1.301  -1.494  -2.950  -2.433  -2.285  -1.942
(-3.94)  (-4.10)  (-4.60)  (-4.47)  (-4.29)  (-3.92)
Democratically  Elected  0.585  0.658  0.857  0.792  0.912  0.812
(2.61)  (2.71)  (2.704)  (2.72)  (3.09)  (2.80)
Time in Power  -0.089  -0.10  -0.175  -0.133  -0.113  -0.107
(-2.07)  (-2.16)  (-2.79)  (-2.45)  (-2.09)  (-2.00)
Time in Power 2 0.003  0.003  0.006  0.005  0.004  0.004
(2.15)  (2.21)  (2.56)  (2.34)  (2.02)  (1.88)
Preparation  Staff  Weeks  0.682  0.903  0.323  0.091
(1.39)  (2.16)  (0.24)  (0.08)
Supervision  Staff Weeks  -1.554  -1.428  -0.869  -0.934
(-2.73)  (-2.98)  (-0.67)  (-0.84)
Finance  Conditions  (%/6)  1.274  1.252  1.423
(1.78)  (1.86)  (2.02)
Macro  & Fiscal Conditions  (/o)  0.448  0.927  0.766
(0.44)  (1.06)  (0.89)
Sectoral  Conditions  (%)  2.087  1.536  1.161
(2.82)  (2.46)  (1.83)
Trade  Conditions  (%)  1.965  1.181  0.961
(2.42)  (1.85)  (1.46)
2nd  and 3rd Tranch Conditions  1.849  0.915
(2.28)  (1.45)
Number  of Conditions  (%/6)  0.368
(1.39)
Loan  Size (log)  -0.144
(-0.82)
Expected  Reform  Period  -1.4E-3
(-0.31)
Prior Analytical  Work  (log)  0.051
(0.35)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.175
(-0.44)
Latin America  & Caribbean  0.009
(0.02)
East Asia  0.056
(0.12)
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -0.213
(-0.98)
Initial Population  (log)  0.144
(1.56)
Predicted  ability  0.75  0.73  0.83  0.80
Note: Probit  regressions.  Regressions  (S)-(6)  are estimated  by a two-stage  procedure  [Amemiya (1978), described  in
appendix,  with  preparation  and supervision  specifications  given in column  2, Table 4, and column  2, Table  5.Table 4. Preparation regressions
Dependent  variable:  Preparation  Staff Weeks
Regression No.  (1)  (2)
Observations  219  179
Countries  67  60
Constant  1.813  3.311
(21.58)  (4.38)
Ethnic  Fractionalization  0.376  0.018
(1.00)  (0.04)
Ethnic  Fractionalization 2 -0.327  0.043
(-0.82)  (0.10)
Government  Crisis  -0.132  -0.223
(-1.51)  (-2.48)
Democratically  Elected  0.098  0.124
(1.67)  (1.98)
Time in Power  0.013  0.004
(1.24)  (0.36)
Time in Power 2 -3.4E-3  -3.7E-3
(-0.95)  (-0.99)
Finance  Conditions  (°/O)  -0.149
(-1.07)
Macro & Fiscal  Conditions  (%/6)  -0.260
(-1.33)
Sectoral  Conditions  (%)  0.002
(0.02)
Trade Conditions  (%)  -0.021
(-0.15)
Number  of Conditions  (%)  0.153
(3.29)
Loan Size  (log)  0.281
(5.29)
Structural  Adjustment  Loan  -0.145
(-2.16)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.080
(-0.78)
Latin America  & Caribbean  -0.284
(-3.06)
East Asia  -0.148
(-1.39)
Initial  GDP per capita (log)  -0.064
(1.04)
Initial  Population  (log)  -0.147
(-3.90)
R 2 0.04  0.34
Adjusted  R 2 0.01  0.26
Note: Estimation  by OLS
32Table 5. Supervision regressions
Dependent  variable:  Supervision  Staff  Weeks
Regression No.  (1)  (2)
Observations  179  179
Countries  60  60
Constant  2.685  3.272
(4.02)  (3.11)
Ethnic  Fractionalization  -0.134  -0.144
(-0.42)  (-0.46)
Ethnic  Fractionalization 2 0.213  0.254
(0.59)  (0.73)
Government  Crisis  -0.029  -0.017
(-0.39)  (-0.18)
Democratically  Elected  -6.1  E-3  -0.009
(-0.01)  (-0.18)
Time in Power  0.003  0.004
(0.29)  (0.48)
Time in Power2  -3.6E-3  -4.7E-3
(-1.14)  (-1.47)
Preparation  Staff  Weeks  0.339  0.364
(5.14)  (1.34)
Finance  Conditions  (%/o)  -0.078  -0.120
(-0.67)  (-0.99)
Macro & Fiscal  Conditions  (%)  -0.323  -0.256
(-1.97)  (-1.41)
Sectoral  Conditions  (%)  0.180  0.175
(1.65)  (1.59)
Trade Conditions  (%)  -0.141  -0.141
(-1.25)  (-1.23)
Number  of Conditions  (%)  0.074  0.077
(1.85)  (1.28)
Loan Size  (log)  0.210  0.220
(4.37)  (2.50)
Structural  Adjustment  Loan  -0.062  -0.105
(-1.10)  (-1.58)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.093
(1.09)
Latin America  & Caribbean  0.020
(0.25)
East Asia  -0.118
(-1.33)
Initial  GDP per capita (log)  -0.153  -0.184
(-2.96)  (-3.39)




Note: Estimation  by OLS  Jcol. (4), and 2SLS estimation  [col. (2)] with instruments  given in regression  2, Table  4.
33Table 6.  Linear Probability Regressions
Dependent variable: OED evaluation on adjustment operations
Regression  No.  (|)  |(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Observations  | 220  | 215  163  182  | 179  179
Constant  0.472  0.674  0.505  0.306  0.513  0.852
(4.77)  (1.01)  (1.40)  (1.13)  (1.30)  (2.54)
Ethnic  Fractionalization  1.888  1.939  1.513  2.199  2.187  2.122
(4.29)  (4.09)  (2.97)  (4.62)  (4.23)  (4.20)
Ethnic  Fractionalization 2 -2.073  -2.196  -1.589  -2.244  -2.275  -2.235
(-4.42)  (-4.00)  (-2.95)  (-4.49)  (-3.99)  (-4.05)
Government  Crisis  -0.423  -0.45.2  -0.635  -0.575  -0.617  -0.594
(-4.08)  (-4.20)  (-4.77)  (4.85)  (-4.84)  (-4.82)
Democratically  Elected  0.184  0.204  0.232  0.218  0.260  0.253
(2.66)  (2.68)  (2.96)  (2.86)  (3.25)  (3.15)
Time in Power  -0.026  -0.028  -0.041  -0.033  -0.030  -0.029
(-2.08)  (-2.15)  (-2.80)  (-2.34)  (-2.09)  (-2.04)
Time in Power 2 9.7E-3  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
(2.30)  (2.28)  (2.83)  (2.43)  (2.18)  (2.08)
Preparation  Staff  Weeks  0.142  0.196  -0.009  -0.019
(1.18)  (1.81)  (0.02)  (-0.06)
Supervision  Staff  Weeks  -0.316  -0.344  -0.207  -0.236
(-2.47)  (-3.00)  (-0.55)  (-0.74)
Finance  Conditions  (%)  0.316  0.298  0.359
(1.76)  (1.66)  (1.92)
Macro  & Fiscal Conditions  (%/)  0.119  0.207  0.191
(0.47)  (0.89)  (0.79)
Sectoral  Conditions  (%)  0.450  0.366  0.299
(2.44)  (2.14)  (1.66)
Trade Conditions  (%/o)  0.449  0.270  0.247
(2.30)  (1.59)  (1.36)
2nd and 3rd Tranch Conditions  0.413  0.266
(2.09)  (1.51)
Number  of Conditions  (%/.)  0.076
(1.21)
Loan  Size (log)  -0.063
(-1.45)
Expected  Reform  Period  -7.84E-05
(-0.69)
Prior Analytical  Work  (log)  0.008
(0.22)
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.080
(-0.66)
Latin America  & Caribbean  -0.020
(-0.18)
East Asia  0.025
(0.19)
Initial GDP per capita (log)  -0.086
(-1.24)
Initial Population  (log)  0.030
(1.12)
0.17  0.20  0.34  0.32
Adjusted  R2 0.15  0.15  0.28  0.26
Note: Estimation  by OLS  [cols. (1)-(4)],  and 2,SLS  [cols. (5)-(6)]  with  preparation  and  supervision  specifications
given in column 2, Table  4, and  column 2, Table 5.
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